Aug 29, 2017
Jolley Hall, Room 309
"Computational Explorations of Information and Mechanism Design in Markets"
Adviser: Sanmay Das
Markets or platforms assemble multiple selfishly-motivated, strategic agents together. The outcomes of such agent interactions depend heavily on the rules, regulations, and norms of the platform, and also the information available to agents. Poorly designed platforms and information environment suffer from unexpected and undesirable results, for example, agent manipulation, unnecessary expense of human effort and equipment, and so on. In this thesis, I address the impact of the design and analysis of mechanisms and information structures on the outcome of single platforms, as well as the dynamics of multiple platform interaction. We use multiple approaches, including computational game theory, multi-agent simulation, and empirical game analysis, to model questions in both static and dynamic matching markets. This thesis focuses on providing specific insights for important real-world domains like kidney exchange and financial markets, and also methodological advances in modeling complex and dynamic agent interaction environments.