Green Hall, Room 0120 (Rodin Auditorium)
Justin Ruth will present
Abstract: While the modernization of control processes has led to unprecedented levels of productivity and efficiency, the coupling of the physical processes with an overarching cyber communication control layer opens up new vulnerabilities in such so called Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). While attacks can be viewed as unknown disturbances or faults in the system, the strategic nature of attacks raises altogether new research challenges. Chief among them is to quantify the effect that an attacker can have, which is determined by the dynamics of the system, the design of the controller and state estimator, and the form of the attack detection method. In this talk I describe our work to quantify the impact that an attacker can have, including the prerequisite step to optimally tune attack detectors to a desired level of performance. I consider two major classes of static and dynamic detectors and show experimental results on scaled-industrial control systems.